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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War era, countries negotiated numerous
arms control agreements. The negotiations occurred between the
superpowers, between their respective blocs, and during the an-
nual multilateral United Nations Conference on Disarmament. 1
The end of the Cold War brought changes to the international
security environment and technological developments in weapons
systems.2 The changes led to additional arms control treaties and
to the reconsideration of earlier agreements.3 Amending arms
* Burrus M. Carnahan, J.D., Northwestern University; LL.M., University of Michi-
gan; Senior Analyst, Science Applications International Corp.; Lecturer in Law, George
Washington University
** Katherine L. Starr is a Foreign Media Analyst at the U.S. Information Agency,
prior to which she worked for Science Applications International Corp. as an Arms Con-
trol Policy Analyst. She has an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, School of Advanced International Studies.
1. See, e.g., Conference on Disarmament: Limited Progress Reported on Chemical
Weapons Ban, 26 U.N. Chronicle 30 (Dec. 1989).
2. See LYNN E. DAVIS, AN ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY FOR THE NEW EUROPE 4
(1993).
3. See generally BRAD ROBERTS, WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND WORLD ORDER
AFTER THE COLD WAR (1996).
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control treaties, however, is difficult because of the complexity of
the negotiation process and security concerns. Therefore, coun-
tries are often understandably reluctant to amend arms control
treaties. Nevertheless, some countries closely scrutinized a num-
ber of treaties, testing both the treaties' adaptability and the par-
ties' willingness to consider change.4
4. See, e.g., The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC]. In April 1997, the U.S. Senate included a set of over 20
"conditions" in the ratification instrument. These quite complex conditions do not for-
mally constitute amendments or reservations to the treaty text. CWC Article XXII pro-
hibits reservations. See also Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 499-517 (1997). Members of the Ad
Hoc Group to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583 [hereinafter BWC] are now negotiating a verification protocol. See also
'Rolling Text'for BWC Protocol Introduced, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June-July 1997, at
27. Among bilateral arms control treaties, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
ABM] underwent a series of modifications and attempted reinterpretations since 1972
while attempting to ensure the maintenance of a strategic balance between the United
States and Russia in light of technological advances. The Reagan administration initially
attempted to reinterpret the ABM treaty to allow certain Strategic Defense Initiative
tests, but the Soviet Union and key members of the U.S. Congress rejected these interpre-
tations. More recently, controversy focused on distinguishing between strategic defense
systems that would be governed by the ABM treaty and defenses against theater ballistic
missiles (such as the SCUD missiles Iraq used in both its war with Iran and the 1991 war
over Kuwait), that would not be limited by the ABM treaty. A series of agreements be-
tween the United States and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan partially resolved
some of the latter issues. Most recently, indeed in January 1999, the U.S. government in-
dicated that it was exploring a national missile defense system, which may require "modi-
fication" of the ABM treaty. See Memorandum of Understanding Relating to The Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On
The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, reprinted in New START
11 and ABM Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, 20 (1997); see also First
Agreed Statement Relating to The Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of
May 26, 1972, reprinted in New START II and ABM Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 19, 21 (1997); Second Agreed Statement Relating to The Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, reprinted in New START H
and ABM Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, 21 (1997); Common Under-
standing Related to The First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to The
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
on The Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, reprinted in New
START H and ABM Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, 21 (1997); Com-
mon Understanding of The Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1979, Relating to
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Republics
on The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, reprinted in New
START II and ABM Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, 22 (1997);
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Instances exist where a treaty requires modification to remain
relevant and viable. During the life of a treaty, disputes arise over
legal interpretations that require resolution. Additionally, tech-
nological advances or changes in national security requirements
may require modifications to the arms control agreements. A
party's tacit neglect of the need for modification, a lack of confi-
dence in the treaty, or even outright non-compliance can make a
treaty obsolete.
This Article examines both the legal theory and the practical
realities involved in amending an international arms control
agreement. First, the Article reviews the customary international
law applicable to amending multilateral treaties. Second, it ex-
amines the amendment provisions included in every major multi-
lateral arms control agreement since World War 11.5 Alternative
efforts to change a treaty in force, as opposed to formal amend-
ments, will also be discussed.6 Finally, the Article examines the ra-
tionales behind the amendment provisions, why nations have not
properly utilized these provisions, and suggests alternatives to
treaty amendments.
II. EARLY HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL AMENDMENT
PROCEDURES
The birth of international arms control law can be traced to
St. Petersburg, Russia. 7 One hundred and thirty years ago, the
Russian Czar's government convened the first international con-
ference to consider prohibiting the small-caliber explosive bullet.8
The conference resulted in the St. Petersburg Declaration (Decla-
ration), the first multilateral treaty to ban or restrict the use of a
particular weapon in war.9 The Declaration marked a new phe-
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related To Systems To Counter Ballistic
Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles, reprinted in New START II and ABM
Treaty Documents, 27 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, 23 (1997).
5. This Article primarily focuses on the discussion of multilateral treaties. Where
relevant, however, reference is made to bilateral treaties, such as the ABM Treaty, for il-
lustration purposes.
6. See infra Part IV.A, discussing alternative means to the amendment process.
7. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, In Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes, Weight, signed Nov.29/Dec.11, 1868, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 101 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
St. Petersburg Declaration].
8. See id.
9. See id In 1863, the Russian army developed an explosive rifle bullet that deto-
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nomenon in both diplomatic history and international law.
The delegates at the St. Petersburg conference foresaw the
need to amend or revise the treaty. The final paragraph of the
Declaration reflects this sentiment:
The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to
come hereafter to an understanding whenever a precise propo-
sition may be drawn up in view of future improvements which
science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to main-
tain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate
the necessities of war with the laws of humanity. 10
The delegates failed, however, to include procedural details.
For example, the provision does not include a filtering process for
determining whether a new proposition meets the "precise propo-
sition" requirement. The provision does not clarify who might le-
gitimately draft a "precise proposition" for new arms restrictions.
While parties to the Declaration have standing to make a "precise
proposition," non-parties are not explicitly excluded. 11 Contrary
to the nineteenth century idea of state sovereignty, the parties
might consider proposals from a non-governmental organization,
such as the then newly-formed International Committee of the
Red Cross.
Additionally, the Declaration does not specify the means to
consider and approve the new proposition. Suppose, for example,
that one party proposed amending the Declaration to prohibit ex-
plosive rounds weighing 500 grams instead of the original 400
grams. Although this appears to be a "precise proposition" within
the meaning of the final clause of the Declaration, it is unclear how
nated upon impact with a hard surface, and that could, therefore, be used to attack artil-
lery caissons and ammunition wagons. By 1867, however, this projectile had been modi-
fied to explode upon impact with a soft surface, such as human flesh. At this point, the
Russian government sought an international ban on the use of such weapons. See Stat.,
supra note 7. The rationale behind the Declaration was that an enemy soldier wounded by
a mid-nineteenth century rifle bullet would almost certainly be out of action by that im-
pact alone. To further aggravate his wound by using an explosive bullet was militarily un-
necessary and needlessly cruel. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red
Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 705, 715-17 (1996).
The United States did not participate in the St. Petersburg Conference. It is interesting to
note, moreover, that similar explosive bullets had been occasionally used in the American
Civil War. By the end of that conflict, both General Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Army
Chief of Ordinance had also concluded that such munitions were inhumane and should no
longer be used. See ROBERT BRUCE, LINCOLN AND THE TOOLS OF WAR 282 (1989).




the parties would proceed with the proposal.
12
As the Declaration's depository, the Imperial Russian gov-
ernment might convene a second St. Petersburg conference to con-
sider such a proposal. If it refused to undertake this role, however,
another party would not be precluded from hosting the confer-
ence. 13 Furthermore, it is unclear whether a conference is even
necessary. In principle, the parties to the Declaration can imple-
ment a new restriction by exchanging diplomatic notes.
Regardless of whether a conference is held or the new pro-
posal is considered solely through diplomatic channels, the pro-
posal's fate is unclear. If the parties to the Declaration disagree on
the proposal, it is unclear whether other means of adoption are
available.
14
It is assumed that the drafters of the St. Petersburg Declara-
tion intended customary international law to determine these pro-
cedural issues. The old customary rule allowing multilateral treaty
amendments, which was still applied as late as the middle of the
twentieth century, required unanimous consent.15 Thus, the par-
ties to the St. Petersburg Declaration likely assumed that amend-
ment or revision required unanimity.
The assumption that an amendment or revision requires una-
nimity is also supported by the following clause in the Declaration,
"[the Agreement will]... cease to be compulsory from the mo-
ment when, in a war between Contracting or Acceding Parties, a
non-Contracting Party or a non-Acceding Party shall join one of
the belligerents.' 16 Thus, once a non-party enters into a conflict
with any of the parties, the Declaration is suspended. As a result,
the parties are allowed to use the small caliber bullet against any
belligerent power.
The clause shows the parties' intent to eliminate a two-tiered
set of obligations. It must be assumed, therefore, that the parties




15. See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
106 (2d ed. 1984). For example, until the adoption of a protocol establishing amendment
procedures, the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Feb. 8,
1949, 1 U.S.T. 477, 481 could only be amended by unanimous consent of its 16 parties. See
The Law of Treaties and other International Agreements, 1973 DIGEST §§ 3-4, at 183-84.
16. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 7, at 102.
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mous consent. A non-unanimous amendment could create a two-
tiered regime where, for example, some parties banned the use of
exploding bullets under 500 grams, while others were bound only
by the original 400 gram limit.
The amendment and revision clause of the St. Petersburg
Declaration may best be described as rudimentary. Nonetheless,
most other nineteenth and early twentieth century arms control
and limitation agreements did not include amendment provi-
sions.
17
The 1907 Hague Convention on Naval Contact Mines (1907
Convention) was the only treaty to include a review and revision
provision.18 The provision allowed for treaty review and revision
either six and one-half years after its entry into force or at the
Third Hague Peace Conference, whichever occurred first.19  The
provision concluded with the following clause: "If the Contracting
Parties conclude a fresh Convention relative to the employment of
mines, the present Convention shall cease to be applicable from
the moment it comes into force." 20 The clause seems to infer that
the parties to the 1907 Convention must act unanimously espe-
cially since it does not provide that it shall remain in force for
states not consenting to the amendment.
The hostility towards a two-tiered system of arms control ob-
ligations continued to exist during the early 1900s. Many of the
agreements included a clause, similar to one in the St. Petersburg
Declaration, lifting the obligations of the parties in any war in
which a non-party participated. 21 This pattern supports the con-
17. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poison-
ous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, 94 U.N.T.S. 65; The Hague Declaration of 1907 (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET NO. 7 at 1, 2 [hereinafter Decla-
ration XIV]; Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, reprinted
in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 7, at 105 [hereinafter Declaration (IV,
2)]; The Hague Declaration of 1899 (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899,
reprinted in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 7, at 109 [hereinafter Declara-
tion (IV, 3)].
18. See Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Art. 12, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in 36 Stat. 2332 [hereinafter Convention (VIII)].
19. See id. The outbreak of World War I prevented both the Third Hague Peace
Conference and the alternative review contemplated by Article 12.
20. Id. art. 12.
21. See id. art. 7; Declaration (XIV), supra note 17, at 1839, 1840; Declaration (IV, 2),
supra note 17, at 106; Declaration (IV, 3), supra note 17, at 110.
[Vol. 20:615620
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clusion that early arms control agreements required unanimous
approval for revisions.
Outside the field of arms control, however, the parties to mul-
tilateral agreements often ignored the unanimous rule. For exam-
ple, during the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, the dele-
gates extensively revised the 1899 Convention on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land.22 They also redrafted its articles on
neutrality,23 despite the fact that seventeen parties to the original
Convention were not parties to the revised Convention of 1907.24
The departure from the unanimous text of the 1907 Conven-
tion allowed a two-tiered system of obligations. The 1907 Conven-
tion specifically provides that "[t]he Convention of 1899 remains in
force as between the Powers which signed it, and which do not also
ratify the present Convention." 25 Despite the departure from the
unanimous rule, parties have never questioned the legitimacy of
the 1907 Convention or the proceedings of the 1907 Hague Peace
Conference.
After World War II, a number of factors further undermined
the unanimous doctrine. First, international organizations' consti-
tutional documents typically included specific provisions for
amendment procedures. 26 Second, the proliferation of multilateral
agreements led to greater awareness of the need for amendment
procedures. 27 Third, the growth in the number of independent
states following the decolonization process made unanimity prag-
matically impossible. 28 Finally, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in 1968 resulted in the unanimity presumption's
22. See Revision of Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 as adopted in Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227.
23. See Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Per-
sons In Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310.
24. Korea and Spain represent the only parties to the 1899 Convention (II) With Re-
spect to The Laws and Customs of War on Land who neither signed nor acceded to the
Convention. In addition, Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy,
Montenegro, Paraguay, Peru, Persia, Serbia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela, all parties
to the 1899 Convention, signed, but never ratified the 1907 Convention. See THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 7, at 88-91.
25. Convention (IV), supra note 23.
26. For a listing of various agreements after WWII with amendment procedures, see
infra notes 56-58.
27. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of Dec.
31, 1993, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 (1993).
28. See SINCLAIR, supra 15, at 106.
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final demise. 29
Articles 40 and 41 of the Vienna Convention, which govern
multilateral agreement amendments in the absence of any provi-
sion in the treaty, abolish the presumption of the unanimous
rule.30 Article 40 addresses amendments where all parties to the
treaty have had the opportunity to negotiate and participate.
31
Paragraph 3 of Article 40 provides that after the negotiation of an
amendment, "[e]very State entitled to become a party to the treaty
shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as
amended. '32 Paragraph 4 of Article 40 states that "[t]he amending
agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty
which does not become a party to the amending agreement. ' 33 So
long as all parties have had an opportunity to participate in the
process, these provisions imply that only the support of a few par-
ties is needed to affect an amendment to a multilateral treaty.
Article 41 rejects the old unanimity rule even more emphati-
cally. It allows two or more parties to a multilateral treaty to
modify the treaty as between themselves, so long as the treaty text
does not provide otherwise and the proposed modification:
"(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obliga-
tions;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective executions of the object and pur-
pose of the treaty as a whole." 34
29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 40-41,8 I.L.M.
679, 694-5 (1969). The Convention is widely recognized as an authoritative restatement of
customary international law even for states, such as the United States, that are not parties
to it. "Since... most articles of the Convention codify customary international law, they
reflect the law even for states that have not adhered to the Convention, and in many cases
even for agreements concluded before the Vienna Convention came into force."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
Introductory Note, Part III, at 146-47. In summarizing the practice of the International
Court of Justice, one authority recently observed, "[w]henever the Court has found it ap-
propriate, it has referred to the Convention in its jurisprudence; and this may be an indica-
tion that in its view the instrument has-in large part at least-been received in the whole of
general international law." E.W. Vierdag, The International Court of Justice and the Law
of Treaties in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 145, 146
(Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
30. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 40-41, supra note 29, at 694.






Finally, amendment or modification practices suggest that
amending or modifying arms control agreements may represent a
lex specialis, departing from the liberal regime reflected in Articles
40 and 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
35
III. AMENDMENT PROCEDURES IN POST-WWII ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
3 6
This section briefly surveys amendment procedures for se-
lected arms control treaties, beginning with the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty and ending with the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmines Con-
vention (APL). By comparing procedural requirements for
amendment, several patterns become evident. Treaties typically
fall within one of three categories, to be discussed below.
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is arguably the first post-World
War II arms control agreement.37 The treaty, enacted at the end
of the 1958-59 International Geophysical Year, preserved Antarc-
tica for peaceful scientific research. The Antarctic Treaty was not
exclusively an arms control treaty, but also negotiated other inter-
ests, including environmental concerns and scientific coopera-
tion.38
Arms control provisions were included in the treaty to pre-
vent Cold War rivals from using the continent for military pur-
poses. 39 For example, Article I provides that Antarctica may be
used for "peaceful purposes only," and it prohibits "any measures
of a military nature" including "the establishment of military bases
and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well
as the testing of any type of weapons." 40 In addition, Article V
prohibits nuclear explosions in Antarctica.
41
The Antarctic Treaty includes specific amendment provisions
in its text. Article XII(1) describes the requisite amendment and
35. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 40-41, supra note 29, at 694.
36. This Article primarily focuses on the discussion of multilateral treaties. Where
relevant, however, this Article references bilateral treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile Treaty for illustration purposes. See infra p. 638, Table 1, Amendment Procedures for
Selected Arms Control Treaties, for a description of the amendment requirements of the
major post-World War II arms control treaties.
37. See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 72.
38. See id.
39. See F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 84-94 (1982) for a discussion
on the origins of the Treaty.
40. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 37,12 U.S.T. at 795,402 U.N.T.S. at 72.
41. See id. at 796, 76.
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modification procedures:
The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose repre-
sentatives are entitled to participate in meetings provided under
Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter
into force when the depositary government has received notice
from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.
42
Article IX provides that the twelve original parties to the
Treaty, plus others engaged in "substantial scientific research" in
Antarctica, will hold "consultative meetings" on implementing the
Treaty.43 As of 1995, twenty-five of the thirty-nine parties held
"consultative" status. 44 Although the "consultative" parties can-
not bring an amendment into force for all the contracting parties,
paragraph 1(b) of Article XII states that any amendment agreed to
by the "consultative" parties must be ratified within two years by
the other parties to the Treaty or they will lose their party status.
45
As a result, amendments proposed by the "consultative" parties
are provisionally implemented regardless of the "non-
consultative" parties agreement.
The 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty46 (LTBT) repre-
sents the first multilateral arms control treaty with detailed
amendment provisions. Similar to the Antarctic Treaty, the LTBT
differentiates the original parties' role in amendment procedures
from the other parties to the treaty.47 The LTBT requires una-
nimity among the three original parties (the United States, Rus-
sia,48 and the United Kingdom) when voting for an amendment;
42. Id. at 798, 80-81.
43. The 12 original parties include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, French Re-
public, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. See id. at
795.
44. In addition to the 12 original parties, Brazil, China, Germany, India, Italy, Poland,
and Uruguay have achieved consultative status. Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Romania, and Sweden do not have consultative status. See Antarctic Treaty Special
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources: Final Act and Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 27 I.L.M. 859 (1988).
45. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 37, 12 U.S.T. at 799, 402 U.N.T.S. at 82.
46. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
47. See id.
48. As successor to the Soviet Union.
[Vol. 20:615
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however, these parties cannot amend the treaty alone.49 The
LTBT amendment process allows any party to propose an
amendment followed by one-third of the parties calling for a con-
ference. 50 At the conference, a majority of all parties, including
the original three, must vote in favor of adoption.
51
The final sentence of Article II makes the LTBT unusual.
Once adopted by the conference, "[t]he amendment shall enter
into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratifica-
tion by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of
ratification of all the Original Parties." 52 Thus, the retreat from
the unanimity rule in the LTBT extends beyond that in the Ant-
arctic Treaty. For example, a party that never ratified the amend-
ment or even voted against it at the conference may be bound by
the amendment.
53
Both the Antarctic Treaty and the LTBT retreat from the
unanimity rule. Under the procedures of both treaties, there is no
possibility of a two-tiered set of treaty obligations. As a result,
parties bound by the original text are also bound by an amend-
ment.54 After 1963, however, the pendulum began to swing to-
wards two-tiered treaty obligations.
With one exception, 55 arms control agreements concluded af-
ter the LTBT may be classified into three general categories. The
first category consists of treaties with significant procedural im-
pediments to amendment. The treaties allow some parties to opt
out of the amendment while remaining bound by the original
treaty text.56 The second category of treaties are less difficult to
49. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, supra note 46, art. 11 (2), 14 U.S.T. at 1317,480 U.N.T.S. at 47.
50. See id. art. 11 (1).
51. See id. art. 11 (2).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. See id. art. 11 (2).
54. See id.
55. See African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Apr. 11,
1996, art. 19, 35 I.L.M. 698. This treaty reverts to the LTBT pattern. It provides for pro-
posed amendments to be circulated to all parties. If adopted by a vote of two thirds of the
parties, an amendment "shall enter into force for all parties after receipt by the Depositary
of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Parties." Id. at 712 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, art. 13 (5), 36
I.L.M. 1507, 1517 [hereinafter Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines]; Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Oct. 26, 1979, art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, at 4
(ratification of amendment by two thirds of parties required); Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. VIII, 21 U.S.T. 483, 491-192, 729
1998]
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amend, but still require acceptance by a majority. Again, the trea-
ties permit parties to remain bound to the original treaty text
without being bound to subsequent amendments. 57 The third
category of treaties are those that recently returned to the una-
nimity rule, or that required amendment adoption by consensus.
58
A. The First Group: Complex and Difficult Amendment,
Stricter Procedures
Procedural requirements for amendments to the first group
typically include the following: (1) A certain percentage of parties
(usually one-third, one-half, or a majority) supporting convening
an amendment conference; (2) A conference of states parties con-
sidering the amendment; (3) A special majority (often two thirds
of the states party, and sometimes including key states such as the
treaty depositaries) approving the amendments; (4) Entry into
force (EIF) after a majority of parties (again including key states)
ratifies and accedes to the amendments; and (5) EIF only for those
parties ratifying or acceding to the amendment. 59
U.N.T.S. 161, 173-174 [hereinafter NPT] (both a favorable vote of the depositories [such
as Russia, United Kingdom and United States] at the amendment conference and ratifica-
tion by the depositories are required for entry into force of any amendment).
57. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, art. VI, 16 I.L.M. 88; BWC, supra
note 4, art. II; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-
soil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1972, art. VI, 23 U.S.T. 701, 707, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, 119 [hereinafter
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons]; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2420, 610 U.N.T.S.
205,208 [hereinafter Treaty Governing Outer Space]. The Treaty Governing Outer Space
includes arms control provisions in Article IV, which, inter alia, prohibit the orbiting of
weapons of mass destruction around the earth and the creation of fortifications or military
bases on the moon and other celestial bodies. See id. art. IV, at 2413.
58. See Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, art. VII, 35 I.L.M. 1439,
1455-56; Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, art. 19,
35 I.L.M. 635, 645; CWC, supra note 4, art. XV; Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, art.
XVI S. TREATY DOc. No. 102-37, 27 (1992); Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,
Nov. 19, 1990, art. XX, 30 I.L.M. 1; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985,
art. 11, 24 I.L.M. 1440, 1449; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have In-
discriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, art. 8, 19 I.L.M. 1523,1527-28 [hereinafter Convention
on Conventional Weapons].
59. An exception to this feature is found in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281. Under Article 29, proposed
amendments, after circulation to all parties, require a two thirds vote of those states pres-
ent and voting at a special session of the General Conference of states party to the Treaty.
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These procedural hurdles serve to make amendments more
difficult, perhaps ensuring that parties carefully weigh and debate
amendments prior to their EIF. For the United States and other
Western countries, these procedures prevent an "automatic ma-
jority," such as the bloc of non-aligned countries, from adopting
amendments.
B. The Second Group: Lower Hurdles, Simpler Procedures
Like the first group, the second category of treaties only binds
states when they ratify an amendment, thereby potentially result-
ing in a two-tiered obligation scheme. Treaties of this type gener-
ally present fewer impediments to the amendment process. For
example, any party may propose an amendment and an amend-
ment conference is not required.60 Furthermore, although a ma-
jority is needed to ratify an amendment, the amendment binds
only those states that vote for its adoption.61 Since majority accep-
tance is a prerequisite for successful amendment, the second group
of agreements are not as liberal as Article 40 of the Vienna Con-
vention. 62
The treaties included in this group regulate two types of mili-
tary systems: (1) those that have never been deployed, and (2)
those that were of little military significance at the time the treaty
was enacted. For example, the treaties that regulate orbiting nu-
clear weapons, nuclear weapons deployed on the seabed or the
moon, high-threshold environmental weapons and biological
Amendments so adopted then enter into force "as soon as the requirements set forth in
Article 28... have been complied with." Id. Article 28 sets forth the ElF requirements
for the Treaty as a whole. Paragraph 1 requires ratification by all Latin American Repub-
lics, and all other sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere located entirely south of
latitude 35 degrees north, in existence on February 14, 1967, as a condition of entry into
force. See id. art. 28, para. 1. Since several of the states in the region have failed to ratify
(e.g., Cuba), the Treaty has never formally entered into force. See Paragraph 2 of Article
28, however, grants all signatory states the "imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in
part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph," by means of a declaration
annexed to their ratification instruments. Id. art. 28, para. 2. The Treaty is thus in force
for a number of Latin American states. An amendment could presumably be ratified with
a similar declaration, allowing it to come into force for any single state for which the basic
Treaty is in force.
60. See Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons, supra
note 57, art. VI, 23 U.S.T. at 707.
61. See id.
62. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 40, 8 I.L.M. at
694-95. "Every state entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to be-
come a party to the treaty as amended." Id. at 694.
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weapons. 63 The apparent assumption was that there was relatively
slight risk of adopting ill-considered amendments for treaties of
minimal military significance.
Subsequent developments, however, cast doubt on this as-
sumption. For example, in the case of the Biological and Toxins
Weapons Convention (BWC), the threat of biological weapons is
not as minimal as previously imagined at the time of the treaty's
inception in the 1960s. Various incidents, such as the Sverdlovsk
event in the early 1980s, the affirmation of an active offensive
biological weapons program in the Soviet Union, and the discov-
ery of Iraq's offensive biological weapons research question the as-
sumption that these treaties have minimal military significance. 64
C. The Third Group: Unanimity or Consensus
The third group of treaties embrace the unanimity rule that
requires unanimous approval and ratification before an amend-
ment binds the parties. The return of the unanimity rule is most
prevalent in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), and the Open
Skies Treaty.65 The disadvantage of this approach is that one
party's inaction may cause an important amendment to fail. This
inaction may be the consequence of a domestic crisis or other rea-
sons unrelated to the merits of the amendment.
The three treaties, mentioned above, that apply the unanimity
rule consist of regional arrangements with a limited number of po-
tential parties. The negotiators apparently accepted the risk that
an important amendment could fail due to careless inaction. This
risk increases significantly when the treaty is open to participation
by any or all of the approximately 200 independent states of the
world. Therefore, arms control treaties involving a large number
of participants adopt other mechanisms for reintroducing the una-
nimity principle.
63. See generally Treaty Governing Outer Space, supra note 57, 18 U.N.T.S. at 205;
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 57; BWC,
supra note 4.
64. See, e.g., Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Leaving Behind the UNSCOM Legacy in Iraq,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, at 3-6 (June/July 1997)
<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACr/junjul/ekeus.htm>; Milton Leitenberg, Anthrax in
Sverdlovsk: New Pieces to the Puzzle, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1992, at 10-13.
65. See treaties cited supra note 58.
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The Convention on Conventional Weapons and the Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty both require that a con-
sensus at a conference of the parties first approve potential
amendments. 66 A State Department memorandum differentiates
consensus decision-making in international bodies from unanimity:
In practice, consensus means that the decision is substantially
acceptable to delegations and that those which have difficulties
with certain aspects of the resolution are willing to state their
reservations for the record rather than vote against it or record
a formal abstention. Consensus must be distinguished from
unanimity, which requires the affirmative support of all partici-
pants. Essentially, consensus is a way of proceeding without
formal objection. Yet the result is virtually the same: a resolu-
tion is adopted with the support of all states present, albeit fre-
quently with recorded statements of reservation or interpreta-
tion.6
7
Although a conference applying the consensus method does
not require every party to affirmatively vote in favor of the
amendment, the procedure gives any party the power to veto the
amendment by openly voicing an objection. Therefore, the con-
sensus method has virtually the same practical effect as the una-
nimity method. The only difference is that inaction by a single
party in a consensus procedure does not block the amendment.
Two recent arms control agreements, the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), go beyond the consensus rule by requiring both a major-
ity vote of the parties to approve adoption and no parties voting
against the amendment.68 As a result, a party's simple inaction is
insufficient to block an amendment. Any party with substantive
objections may block an amendment only by affirmatively voting
66. See Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, supra note 58, 35
I.L.M. Article 19 explicitly mentions consensus as the procedure for approving a treaty
amendment at a meeting in which all parties are necessary to establish a quorum. The
Convention on Conventional Weapons states that the amendment conference "may agree
upon amendment which shall be adopted and shall enter into force in the same manner as
this Convention" adopted an amendment using a consensus procedure. See Convention
on Conventional Weapons, supra note 58; Captain J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional
Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 MIL. L. REV. 3, 41-44
(1984).
67. Subjects of International Law, 1978 DIGEST § 4, at 158.
68. See CWC, supra note 4, 32 I.L.M. at 820; see also Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, supra note 58, 35 I.L.M. at 1455-57.
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against it.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS
Comparing the various amendment procedures automatically
gives rise to certain questions. Why adopt amendment provisions
at all? As the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests,
why should two sovereign states not have the right to voluntarily
amend a treaty bilaterally? Moreover, should a hold-out-state be
forced to accept an amendment that it has not ratified under cer-
tain circumstances? Finally, do the amendment procedures have
evident patterns?
In resolving these issues, a general pattern in the negotiation
process addressing amendments is suggested. As Table 1 illus-
trates, some treaties have less rigorous amendment procedures
than others. Treaties dealing with serious threats to the balance of
power, such as nuclear and chemical weapons, and the balance of
conventional forces in Europe, are more difficult to amend.69
Despite the careful drafting of the amendment provisions,
amendment efforts rarely succeed. It is possible that these
amendment procedures were drafted to deter and prevent
amendment efforts.7 0 The complex procedural and approval re-
quirements necessary to successfully amend a treaty illustrate this
notion. Thus, amending treaties addressing highly controversial
and important subjects is more difficult.
A. Alternatives to Amendment
The major problem with current amendment procedures is
that they often create a multi-tier treaty regime. With the few ex-
ceptions noted above, most treaties bind only those parties that
ratify the amendment. The resulting multi-tier treaty that binds
some parties to certain provisions is often impractical.
The meaning and application of a treaty, however, may be al-
tered without resorting to amendment procedures. Alternatives to
treaty amendments include creating a protocol, entering into po-
litically binding agreements, and reaching a consensus on interpre-
tation of treaty provisions. These alternatives may be more practi-
69. See, e.g., Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons, su-
pra note 57; see also Treaty Governing Outer Space, supra note 57.
70. See generally Roach, supra note 66.
[Vol. 20:615
Arms Control Agreements
cal than amendments because a multi-tier treaty is avoided.
In 1965, the U.N. Security Council membership expanded
from eleven to fifteen members.71 It would have been impractical
for some members to recognize an eleven member Security Coun-
cil, while others recognize a fifteen member Council. In fact, un-
der Articles 108 and 109 of the U.N. Charter, amendments become
binding on all members when ratified by two-thirds of the mem-
bers.7
2
Few multilateral treaties have been formally amended. With
the BWC, the parties are seeking stronger verification provi-
sions.73 It is uncertain whether this will lead to a formal amend-
ment. Even a rudimentary verification system, such as challenge
inspection procedures, would entail considerable additions to the
BWC text. Additionally, the non-binding amendment procedures
in Article XI of the Convention would likely result in some BWC
parties remaining outside new verification arrangements. 74 This
would require substantial change and possibly lead to a two-tiered
system of obligations. Thus, it is more practical to have verifica-
tion arrangements in the form of a protocol to the Convention
rather than an amendment to the relevant articles.
As a separate treaty, a protocol would not require ratification
by a majority of the BWC parties and would avoid even the mini-
mal procedural restraints in the BWC amendment procedures.
75
Judiciously, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention classifies such a
protocol as a modification of a multilateral treaty between the par-
ties.76 Adoption of a verification protocol appears to meet the Vi-
enna Convention standards for such modification.77 Establishing
more stringent verification provisions among certain BWC parties
should not affect the rights afforded to other parties under the
71. See Questions Relating to the United Nations Charter and Membership in the
United Nations, 1965 U.N.Y.B. 232, U.N. Sales No. 66.11.
72. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Treaty Review Conferences, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 226
(1987).
73. See 'Rolling Text' for BWC Protocol Introduced, supra note 4, at 27; Jonathan B.
Tucker, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr.
1995, at 10.
74. See BWC, supra note 4, 26 U.S.T. at 590.
75. See Barbara Hatch Rosenburg & Gordon Burck, Verification of Compliance with
the Biological Weapons Convention, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE 300,
302-03 (Susan Wright ed., 1990); Cf. Tucker, supra note 73, at 12.
76. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29,8 I.L.M. at 694.
77. See id.
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treaty, or the performance of their obligations.78 The protocol
would not relate to a provision, because any derogation from ex-
isting provisions would be incompatible with the effective execu-
tion of the treaty.
79
Ultimately, practical rather than theoretical considerations
will dictate the process for changing treaties. If the textual scope
of the change is minute in comparison to the treaty, an amendment
might be more appropriate than adding a separate protocol to the
treaty.8
0
Short of amending the original text or creating a protocol,
other possible means to change a treaty include: (1) a side agree-
ment or memorandum of understanding which, unlike a protocol,
would have no direct reference to the treaty per se; (2) a politi-
cally-binding agreement, which implies that it is binding in the cur-
rent political context but lacks the weight of a legally-binding
agreement; and (3) identical letters of intent, which would be sent
to depositaries as an expression of parallel policies.
Occasionally, the parties may avoid amendment procedures if
they reach a consensus on the interpretation of a treaty provision.
In the BWC, for example, there is some confusion over what the
Convention prohibits. Article I forbids possession of agents "of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective, or other peaceful purposes." 81  By emphasizing the
phrase "of types and in quantities," this language can be read to
prohibit only types and quantities for which there is no conceivable
peaceful use. According to this narrow interpretation of Article I,
parties are permitted to possess the agents in question as long as
they were designated for peaceful uses. 8
2
A broader reading of Article I prohibits possession of any
biological agents, no matter what type or in what quantity, that is
not intended for peaceful purposes. This interpretation is more
78. If the verification protocol included stricter accounting provisions for the export
of biological agents, BWC parties who are not parties to the protocol might argue that it
violated their right under BWC Article X to participate in "the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacte-
riological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes." See BWC, supra note 4,
26 U.S.T. at 590.
79. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29.
80. For example, the expansion of the Security Council required changing only one or
two words in each of several Charter Articles.




consistent with the purpose of the BWC, but it stretches the actual
language of Article I.
An amendment to Article I is one way to resolve this ambi-
guity. Amending the article, however, may not be necessary nor
desirable. A more effective way to handle the ambiguities would
be an authoritative interpretation (as described in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention) through the practice of key state parties.83
An authoritative interpretation would allow a substantial
number of the BWC parties to publicly declare that they interpret
Article I to prohibit any type and quantity of agent not actually in-
tended for peaceful purposes. This declaration would effect sub-
sequent practice, reflecting the true interpretation of Article 1.84
These interpretations do not need to be expressly accepted by all
BWC parties for international law to recognize them as authorita-
tive interpretations of the Convention. If the Final Document of a
BWC Review Conference accepted the interpretations by consen-
sus, the interpretations would be valid and bind all BWC parties. 85
The alternatives to treaty amendment are viable means of
updating and interpreting treaties. Parties exercising these alter-
natives can grant clarity and longevity to a treaty's effectiveness.
83. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is gen-
erally accepted as customary international law, the factors to consider when interpreting
treaty obligations include "any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions" and "any subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29.
84. See BWC, supra note 4,26 U.S.T. at 587.
85. See Carnahan, supra note 72, at 228. In 1986, the Final Declaration of the Second
Review Conference of Parties to the BWC took a modest step in this direction. Questions
were raised as to whether the Convention covered artificially produced analogs of natural
poisons (toxins) and whether it covered toxins produced by animals and plants in addition
to those produced by bacteria. The Conference, therefore, affirmed that "the Convention
unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological
agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production. Consequently, toxins
(both proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature
and their synthetically produced analogues are covered." Second Review Conference of
the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons On Their Destruction, Sept. 26,
1986, 26 I.L.M. 196, 197 reprinted in Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of
Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE
391, 393, Sept. 1986 (Susan Wright ed., 1990).
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B. Treaty Amendment Attempts
There have been few attempts to invoke formal amendment
proceedings. The 1991 U.N. Conference on a Comprehensive Test
Ban (LTBT) represents a notable exception because it sought an
amendment to the 1963 Limited Test Ban.86 The conference grew
out of a 1988 proposal by six LTBT parties to amend the Treaty
into a comprehensive test ban.87 If passed, the proposed amend-
ment would add Article VI, which states that protocols to the
Treaty are incorporated into the treaty. In addition, it would add
two new protocols banning all nuclear testing in any environment.
In 1989, the six initiators announced that over thirty-nine
states formally requested an amendment conference. 88 The con-
ference, held in January 1991, ended inconclusively. This was pri-
marily due to opposition by the United States, which as a deposi-
tary state, had veto power over any decision to amend the treaty.
89
In the end, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
opened for signature in 1996 and is currently in the ratification
stage, superseded the LTBT.90
The most ambitious amendment project involving a multilat-
eral arms control agreement is the ongoing effort to "adapt" the
1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to the
86. See Tom A. Zamora, LTBT Amendment Conference to Continue, But No Test
Ban in Sight, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1991, at 14.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. The LTBT requires ratification by all of the depositary states (the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union) for an amendment's entry into force.
The Conference did not formally close, but rather adjourned on January 18, 1991, leaving
open the possibility that it could be reconvened at a future date. The U.S. delegation
stated that it would boycott any future sessions of the conference, thus preventing
amendment of the LTBT. See id. at 14, 17.
90. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction may also represent the super-
seding of a treaty. See Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, supra note 56, 36 I.L.M. at
1509, 1512. In 1996, the Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons was
amended to strengthen its restraints on the use of land mines. See Protocol on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended
May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206, 1210 (1996). States were dissatisfied with these amendments
because they did not amount to a total ban on anti-personnel land mines and thereafter
negotiated the 1997 Convention through a separate conference. See Jim Wurst, Closing In
On a Landmine Ban: The Ottawa Process and U.S. Interests, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
June/July 1997, at 14.
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Soviet Union's breakup and the ongoing changes in the post-Cold
War environment.91 The Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe is apparently succeeding in this process despite the
CFE Treaty's explicit adoption of the unanimity rule for amend-
ments. Where the necessary political conditions exist, the una-
nimity rule is workable.
V. CONCLUSION
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from both legal
history and modern procedures about the interaction of law and
policy in amending arms control treaties.
A. What Can Amendment Provisions Accomplish
In determining what an amendment provision can accomplish,
two questions must be considered: (1) What would the inclusion
of an amendment provision accomplish in the negotiating phase
and why is it customary to include one as an article in arms control
treaties?; and (2) What is the objective of an amendment effort to
an in-force treaty? Stated another way, to what end would coun-
tries invoke complicated amendment procedures?
A paradox exists at the heart of arms control treaty amend-
ment clauses. On one hand, inclusion of an amendment provision
is standard, allowing prospective parties to accept legally-binding
provisions while recognizing that political change and technologi-
cal and scientific advances may require future alteration of a
treaty's text.92 On the other hand, parties rarely use amendment
clauses. The more complex and difficult the amendment proce-
dures prescribed, the more these clauses may deter amendment ef-
forts.
Amending a treaty has inherent risks. If changes are not uni-
versally accepted, it may bifurcate the regime. Arms control trea-
ties often represent carefully worked-out compromises affecting
91. See Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-5,
(1997), 36 I.L.M. 866, at 872; see also Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, NATO and Russian
Approaches to 'Adapting' the CFE Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Aug. 1997, at 12.
92. During negotiation of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the U.S. Department
of Energy was apparently nervous that limits would be too stringent concerning peaceful
nuclear explosions. "[U]pon his return to Moscow, [Averill] Harriman conveyed to me his
conviction that in due time it would be possible to amend the treaty in order to liberalize
the rules for Plowsharer projects." GLENN T. SEABORG & BENJAMIN S. LOEB,
STEMMING THE TIDE 317 (Lexington Books ed., 1987).
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the most vital security interests of at least some of the parties.
These parties must be assured that the final balance of compro-
mises and concessions will not be upset at some later date by adop-
tion of an amendment. Indeed, some countries may be concerned
that one successful amendment attempt may gradually erode the
original treaty by encouraging additional parties, who are dissatis-
fied with one element of a treaty, to seek change. Disgruntled par-
ties may have specific grievances for which they seek redress, or
political blocs may be encouraged to form and initiate change to
suit parochial purposes.
B. Alternatives to Using the Amendment Option
Amending most major arms control treaties involves a com-
plicated process of convening a special amendment conference and
then garnering enough support to pass and adopt an amendment.
As noted above, it seems that some amendment processes are in-
tentionally designed not to be used. In part, parties design the
procedural hurdles to avoid frivolous modification attempts.
There are ways to modify a treaty while preserving the fun-
damental obligations of its original text without seeking a formal
amendment. 93 As previously discussed, other vehicles for chang-
ing or expanding treaty obligations include: (1) Agreed Interpre-
tation (e.g., the Zangger Committee, which governs nuclear ex-
ports by NPT parties, is an agreed interpretation of Article III of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty);94 (2) Addition of a Proto-
col or supplemental treaty (e.g., the BWC); (3) Compatible Trea-
ties (e.g., Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty al-
lows conclusion of regional nuclear weapon free zone agreements
to supplement its regime);95 and (4) Superseding Treaties (i.e.,
new agreements that build on and expand older ones, such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty supplanting the Limited Test Ban
93. For a thorough consideration of the legal mechanisms that might be used for the
step-by-step modification of treaties, see George Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty or
Otherwise?, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-47 (1970). Some of these mechanisms are discussed
in this section.
94. See, e.g., the nature of the Zangger Committee and its work, 1 NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY, THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR TRADE 77-78, 83-84 (Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev., 1988).
95. See generally Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, supra




The parties may agree to these approaches during meetings,
such as in the Final Document of a Review Conference. An ex-
change of memoranda and understanding, as in the Biological
Weapons Convention Verification Protocol, may also resolve
which approach the parties will use. In addition, the parties may
negotiate an entirely new treaty to reach an agreement.
Although risks to such alternative means exist, they present
fewer legal challenges and are more acceptable to parties who may
be reluctant to change a treaty's text. Many parties fear that
changing a treaty's text may unravel the fundamental compromises
made at the time of negotiation. By employing other means, it ap-
pears that parties try to balance the realization that a treaty is a
living document, with a cautious reluctance to tamper with the ac-
tual legally-binding text. In essence, more fruitful and potentially
less costly means can achieve desired ends.
C. A Lex Specialis for the Amendment of Arms Control Treaties?
Finally, it is interesting to speculate on the clauses this Article
examines for the customary law of treaties. Over the past thirty
years, no multilateral arms control treaty has adopted the liberal
amendment provisions in Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Indeed, the recent trend has most significant
military treaties (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the CFE Treaty) returning to
the unanimity rule.97 A consistent body of state practice suggests
that Article 40 of the Vienna Convention should not be presumed
to state customary international law. Indeed, if the agreement di-
rectly affects the military security of the parties, state practice sug-
gests it is appropriate to return to the old presumption that the
parties should not adopt an amendment over the objection of any
individual state party.
96. See Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supra note 58.
97. This is either an express unanimity rule or an implicit unanimity rule, imple-
mented by a consensus amendment mechanism.
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TABLE 1
AMENDMENT PROCEDURES FOR SELECTED ARMS
CONTROL TREATIES
98. The Article IX states are comprised of the 12 original parties to the Antarctic
Treaty, plus any later parties engaged in "substantial scientific research" in Antarctica.
99. In general, the Russian Federation assumed the treaty obligations of the former
Soviet Union after its breakup.
100. IAEA BOG stands for the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Gov-
ernors.
Treaty Is An Number Of Number Of Amendment Binding
(date Amendment States Who Votes Enters Into For Non-
opened for Conference Must Call Required At Force Upon Ratifying
signature) Necessary? For A Conference To Ratification By: Party?
Conference Amend
Antarctic Not required; Any "Art. Majority, All Art. IX No
(1959) possible IX" state9 8  including states (penalty
majority of for holding
Art. IX states out)
Limited Required 1/3 of Majority of all Majority of all Yes
Nuclear parties parties, to parties, to
Test Ban include US, include US,
(1963) UK, USSR 9 9  UK, USSR
Outer No Majority of No
Space parties
(1967)
Tlatelolco General Any party 2/3 present Any party can No
(1967) Conference and voting bring into force _
Nuclear Required 1/2 of Majority of all Majority of all No
Non-Pro- parties parties, to parties, to
liferation include US, include US,
(NPT) UK, USSR, & UK, USSR, &
(1968) IAEA IAEA BOG
BOG 1 0 0
Seabed No Majority of No
(1971) 1 parties 1_ _ 1
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Treaty Is An Number Of Number Of Amendment Binding
(date Amendment States Who Votes Enters Into For Non-
opened for Conference Must Call Required At Force Upon Ratifying
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Conference Amend


























Rarotonga Consultative Any party Consensus All parties N/A
(1985) Committee
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Treaty Is An Number Of Number Of Amendment Binding
(date Amendment States Who Votes Enters Into For Non-
opened for Conference Must Call Required At Force Upon Ratifying
signature) Necessary? For A Conference To Ratification By: Party?
Conference Amend
Chemical Required 1/3 of Majority of All parties Yes
Weapons parties parties & no voting in favor
(CWC) negative votes at conference
(1990)
Open Required 3 parties Approval of All parties N/A
Skies all parties
(1992)
Compre- Required Majority of Majority of All parties Yes
hensive parties parties & no voting in favor




Anti- Required Majority of 2/3 present Majority of No
Personnel parties and voting parties
Land-
mines
(1997) 1
640
